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CONCLUSION 
Markets, Strategies, and Institutions 
in Comparative Perspective 
KIRSTEN S. WEVER 
Radcliffe Public Policy Institute 
If this had been another collection of country case studies, it would 
now be possible to map out the similarities and differences across the 
cases covered, possibly in a figure describing various IR-related issues 
by country. However, since this is a collection of different kinds of analy-
ses with a variety of different focuses, the job of concluding this volume 
is not so simple. Nevertheless, in the very variety offered by the chap-
ters in this volume, several themes emerge, most of which are at least 
implicitly, if not explicitly, clarified in the five substantive chapters. The 
chapters point up the need to analyze industrial relations developments 
in the context of a changing global economy—especially the context of 
the broader "competitiveness" pressures and debates that have taken 
center stage on national political and economic agendas. They illustrate 
the simultaneous pressures for decentralization and a realignment of the 
division of labor between central and local decision making and activi-
ties. They draw our attention to the continuing importance of existing 
institutions in shaping industrial relations outcomes and the increasingly 
important role also of actor strategies in shaping outcomes and influenc-
ing how institutions are used. Finally, the chapters underline the impor-
tance of including labor as a major negotiating partner if the benefits of 
economic growth and competitiveness are to be widely diffused across 
different socioeconomic groups and strata, as well as the continuing via-
bility of a model of industrial competitiveness that excludes collective 
labor influence, whose benefits accrue to isolated segments of society 
and economy—not just in the developing world but in advanced indus-
trial countries as well. 
The first part of this concluding chapter will elaborate those themes, 
recalling the chapters as appropriate. The second part sketches out the 
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implications of the six themes for how we think about industrial rela-
tions and for how the actors involved—and particularly organized, inde-
pendent representatives of workers—develop and implement their 
strategies and policies. Three main conclusions follow. First, in order for 
the benefits of a competitive economy to be widely diffused, industrial 
relations and competitiveness issues must be consciously and substan-
tively linked, strategically and institutionally, as well as vertically (across 
levels of analysis) and horizontally (across political and economic issue 
areas). Second, a strong labor movement by itself is not sufficient to 
ensure that such linkages be made—labor strength must be paralleled 
by particular kinds of labor strategies and politics. Third, organized 
labor is not necessarily involved at all in developing and implementing 
these linkages and, in the absence of appropriate strategies and institu-
tions, may well be marginalized in the contemporary global economy. 
In view of these conclusions, the only hope for labor—and ulti-
mately for a model of competitiveness whose benefits are widely dif-
fused throughout economy and society—is to develop strategies that 
insert labor interests and functions into these linkages and make the 
most of the institutional possibilities available in a given setting. 
Six Themes 
The chapters in this volume use a variety of approaches to the com-
parative subject matter. These differences in approach entail a focus on 
different independent and dependent variables and thus different out-
comes. Richard Locke, in his broad sweep comparison of eleven OECD 
member countries, examines a balance of industrial relations, political-
economic and human resources issues. The outcomes he focuses on are 
common patterns in employment practices, as well as marked differ-
ences with respect to the diffusion of employment relations innovations, 
employment security, and wage differentials—all of which are shaped by 
both institutions and actor strategies. Margaret Gardners focus is nar-
rower, concerning labor movement structures and strategies and the 
implications for labors strength and adaptiveness. The chapter by John 
Paul MacDuffie has a dual focus on international management and HR 
practices, on the one hand, and plant- and company-level practices, on 
the other. The outcomes of interest to him have to do with the ways in 
which commonly adopted forms of work and production organization 
are implemented differently in different firms. Sarosh Kuruvilla, in his 
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chapter on the Philippines and Malaysia, looks at the relationship 
between industrialization strategy (in the realm of political economy) 
and industrial relations, as well as the ways in which both sets of vari-
ables shape workplace HR practices. In the last substantive chapter 
Marc Weinstein provides a historical analysis of the strategic shifts in 
Solidarity and is concerned with the effects of these on the overall weak-
ening of the labor movement in Poland. 
Notwithstanding the manifest differences in approach and focus, 
taken together, these chapters suggest a series of interconnected propo-
sitions about the role of industrial relations in the broader political 
economy, the changing locus of the main "action" in industrial relations, 
and the influence of institutions and actor strategies on outcomes. 
The Competitiveness Context 
First, each of these chapters illustrates in one way or another the 
need to understand industrial and employment relations both as they 
influence firm, industry, and national competitiveness and as they are 
influenced by the specific competitiveness issues that are particularly 
salient in a given setting. In this sense, industrial relations must be ana-
lyzed in terms of political as well as economic "competitiveness context." 
For example, as Kuruvilla shows, in Malaysia and the Philippines the 
link between industrial relations and competitiveness is straightforward 
and direct. The perceived needs of competitiveness (as achieved by par-
ticular industrialization strategies) more or less dictate the form and 
content of industrial relations. The two variables stand in simple causal 
relationship to each other. Workplace practices emerge as a function of 
both. Yet even in places like Australia and Germany, where labor move-
ments exist as independent political and economic forces possessing 
widespread social legitimacy, labor increasingly needs to defend its 
actions in economic terms, even while continuing to tend to its political 
representative functions. Thus in Australia the ACTUs reconstruction 
strategy links increases in workplace flexibility (for management) with 
wage increases (for labor) and tries to achieve professionalized career 
paths (for labor) by relaxing job demarcations and broadening skills 
training (for management). In Germany the IG MetalPs efforts to pro-
mote "group work" and to shorten the work week are aimed at providing 
employment stability (for labor) as well as increases in the flexibility of 
work practices (for management). 
These chapters also make clear that companies, industries, and pos-
sibly even nations can be highly competitive without having especially 
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democratic industrial relations or strategically influential labor move-
ments. It is true that the competitiveness of German industry owes 
much to Germany's industrial relations system (Wever 1995; Turner 
1991). However, numerous economies characterized by far less indus-
trial democracy—the U.S., for instance—are also quite competitive by 
international economic standards. What is clear—and evident from both 
the German and American cases, as well as the others considered in this 
volume—is that there is little hope in the long term for an industrial 
relations system that cannot be made to fit a society's understanding (or 
at least that of policy makers) of what is competitive. This fit may entail 
extensive democratically institutionalized labor participation or a near 
total deregulation of labor standards and labor markets. 
The Shifting Local/Central Division of Labor 
The second theme that emerges from these chapters is that every-
where tendencies toward decentralization and deregulation coincide 
with the enduring role of certain centralized and centralizing functions 
and institutions. What emerges as especially important is not the degree 
to which a given setting is characterized by decentralization or central-
ization but rather the relationship between what happens at each of 
these levels. In other words, the focus needs to be on the division of 
labor, so to speak, between local and central actors, organizations, and 
institutions. 
Thus, for example, Gardner points out the success of the Australian 
labor movement in promoting a shift to local flexibility but also the para-
doxical weakening effect on the ACTU's ability to maintain central con-
trol over local policies and practices. Locke elaborates the increasingly 
important role of local institutions and strategies in shaping industrial 
relations outcomes at the local level but also shows the continuing at 
least potential importance of central institutions in mediating between 
pressures for cost-based and value-added approaches to competitiveness. 
In his analysis Weinstein links Solidarity's demise to its apparent near-
abandonment of influence at the local level (e.g., workers councils), 
which then inevitably involved a loss of both political and economic 
influence in central forums as well. MacDuffie illustrates a measure of 
international convergence with regard to the implementation of lean 
production. Yet his chapter also demonstrates that company-based deci-
sions about how new practices are implemented remain critically impor-
tant in determining shopfloor outcomes. 
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The Continuing Importance of Institutions 
The third theme is that the extent and nature of variations in out-
come within a given country are influenced strongly by the nature of its 
institutions. Among other things, some kinds of institutional structures 
promote the diffusion of competitive practices, while others appear 
actively to impede such diffusion. 
Gardner illustrates, by virtue of the comparison between the U.S. 
and Australian labor movements, how the relative paucity of centralizing 
institutions in the U.S. is an important factor underlying the uneven 
development of industrial relations and employment relations innova-
tions. The importance of existing institutions and practices for diffusing 
employment relations innovation is one of Locke's main conclusions. 
Kuruvilla shows how in Malaysia centralized government efforts and 
collaborative employer strategies to develop training resources are nec-
essary to the improvement of local productivity. Weinstein illustrates 
how centralizing institutions help account for the even diffusion of sta-
ble industrial relations practices in the eastern part of the new Germany, 
while their absence helps explain very different outcomes in Poland. 
The Relationship between Institutions and Actor Strategies 
At the same time, actor strategies remain vitally important to shap-
ing, if not determining, outcomes. The relationship between institutions 
and strategies remains different in different settings but appears to be 
changing in all settings. Thus the fourth theme is that this relationship 
deserves to be at the center of industrial relations analyses. 
In the Polish case it appears that the strategy of one of the main 
actors—Solidarity—contributed to the reshaping of the institutions of 
industrial relations in a way that ultimately weakened the union s overall 
political and economic influence. In this case labor was powerful enough 
to exert great influence on institutional outcomes, with the ironic result 
that it thereby seems to have undermined its ability to continue to play 
precisely this role. A very different case is that of New Zealand, where, 
as Gardner illustrates, dramatic labor market deregulation likewise 
undermined the influence of the labor movement at all levels—in this 
case over the objections of labor. MacDuffies cross-regional analysis 
points to the continuing importance of company strategy—to some 
extent independent of macro-level institutions (measured here by region 
rather than by country)—in determining the shape of "lean production" 
in a given setting and subsequent effects at the workplace. In all of these 
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cases there is no particular reason to believe that a given relationship 
between strategy and institutions is in any way frozen or static. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that one or the other is necessarily more 
important: Far from competing in a zero-sum game, particular institu-
tions and actor strategies may either reinforce or undermine each other. 
Diffused Competitiveness Requires Labor Involvement 
With regard to the interrelations between structures and strategies, 
the fifth theme is more specific. In cases where the benefits of competi-
tive firms and industries diffuse to be enjoyed by a broad-based spec-
trum of social actors and groups, labor is invariably included as an 
important negotiating partner in political-economic and industrial rela-
tions decision making above the micro (firm, plant, or workplace) level. 
Where labor is not an important actor in these dynamics, we find pock-
ets of competitiveness coexisting alongside significantly less developed 
segments of the political economy. 
For instance, income disparities in the U.S., where labor does not 
play a major role above the micro level, are extremely high by interna-
tional standards. In Germany, where labor is one of the two main "social 
partners," income polarization is much lower. Similarly, Malaysia and 
the Philippines show distinctly higher levels of poverty and lower levels 
of wage increases in recent years than Singapore, where labor s role is 
somewhat greater. Institutions channel negotiations, and strategies (in 
this instance, labor strategies) give them meaningful content. 
Segmented Competitiveness Is an Equally Likely Outcome 
However, and this is the sixth theme, competitiveness with widely 
diffused benefits is not the only alternative. Many unevenly developed 
political economies with pockets of underdevelopment and low wages as 
well as high levels of income inequality seem quite stable, at least in the 
medium term. 
Thus the development of the Polish economy proceeds apace at a 
rate roughly comparable to that of neighboring former east-bloc coun-
tries, notwithstanding the dramatic weakening of Solidarity and the in-
creasing dominance of the Anglo-American free market model. Neither 
does the U.S. appear to be on the brink of any great socializing legisla-
tion. On the contrary, the contemporary political climate suggests pre-
cisely the opposite: a trend toward further shrinking of the federal gov-
ernment, cutting of social services and entitlements, and deregulation. 
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These developments occur in the face of frequent and dramatic signs of 
social tensions that twenty years ago would have indicated a need for 
more, not less, social democracy. In short, the requirements of competi-
tiveness appear to be compatible both with labor-excluded and labor-
included models of industrial growth and adjustment. 
Implications for Labor and Industrial Relations 
Three general conclusions are suggested. One concerns the impor-
tance of vertical and horizontal policy linkage. The second is the fact 
that union strength and adept labor strategy are not sufficient to ensure 
such linkages. And the third is the fact that this linkage can apparently 
be achieved without any labor involvement at all. These conclusions 
point to a familiar but increasingly urgent policy direction for labor 
which is briefly laid out at the end of this chapter. 
First, key actors in advanced and developing countries alike are link-
ing industrial relations structures and strategies into broader economic 
and social policies, as well as establishing linkages across the different 
levels (micro, meso, macro) at which production and industrial relations 
take place. These kinds of linkage are particularly evident in cases 
where the benefits of economic growth and competitiveness are widely 
diffused throughout the political economy. 
For example, the horizontal and vertical linkages pursued by busi-
ness and government in Malaysia appear to be significantly more devel-
oped than in the Philippines, while Singapore looks more "linked" again 
than Malaysia. In Singapore connections between labor issues, training 
and education, social policy, and economic development, from the 
micro to the macro level, appear to be conscious matters of policy; in 
Malaysia and particularly the Philippines these linkages are fewer and 
appear more reactive than strategic. Singapore's economy is somewhat 
more highly developed, with lower levels of income inequality and 
poverty than in Malaysia or the Philippines. 
Consider also the contrast between Australia and the United States. 
In Australia the ACTU s "Australia Reconstructed" platform explicitly 
addressed the need to pursue a central strategic reorientation of labor s 
main goals. In tandem with this, however, the labor movement initiated 
significant measures for flexibilizing its role at the local level. Measures 
were promoted to broaden skills and encourage the development and 
professionalization of internal labor markets. Structural changes made it 
possible for local unions to engage in ongoing negotiations with employ-
ers about issues that have historically fallen in the centralized domain. 
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In short, the ACTU's strategy consciously linked the functions and 
strategies of labor vertically across levels. Horizontal linkage was also a 
central piece of the ACTU's strategy. The clearest example is the 
acknowledgement of the need to tie central wage determination mecha-
nisms to measures of workplace flexibility. In other words, the econom-
ics of industrial relations were linked directly to the politics of work. 
These linking strategies appear to be at least in part responsible for the 
relatively wide diffusion of workplace innovations referred to by 
Gardner in her comparative analysis of Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States. 
Gardner notes that the diffusion of workplace innovations in the 
United States appears to be considerably more spotty than in Australia 
(though differences in measurement techniques applied in the two 
countries makes comparison difficult). There has indeed been a very 
uneven diffusion of employment relations innovations in the United 
States, with continuing high levels of income inequality and poverty and 
large regional pockets of relative underdevelopment. The competitive-
ness of the U.S. economy—undisputable in international perspective— 
benefits certain socioeconomic segments significantly, while leaving oth-
ers untouched (or worse off than they would otherwise be). 
Moreover, there is a connection between this lack of diffusion in the 
U.S., on the one hand, and the relatively fragmented and decentralized 
nature of American worker representation, on the other. There is no 
equivalent to the powerful and strategically adept ACTU in the United 
States. Union rivalries in the U.S. are far more widespread and politi-
cally damaging than in Australia. Local unions continue to guard jeal-
ously their prerogatives with regard to reaching (or rejecting) agree-
ments with local managers about workplace reorganization. The lack of 
political power at the national level makes it difficult for labor to draw 
the horizontal (political-economic) policy links the ACTU was able to 
draw as part of its reconstruction strategy. 
The second general conclusion is that labors strength and adept 
strategy are not sufficient to ensure these kinds of linkages. In Poland, 
where Solidarity was both unusually powerful and possessed impressive 
strategic capacities, labor has increasingly backed away from involve-
ment in most of the forums in which it once seemed poised to play 
important roles. To the extent that Solidarity is still involved, its involve-
ment is—at least relative to the circumstances of 1990—unlinked across 
levels or across issues. Once active in debates about national economic 
strategy and in workplace restructuring initiatives, Solidarity's influence 
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is weak in both areas today, while its roles in these two arenas do not 
appear to be consciously linked. 
The contrast to developments in eastern Germany is instructive. 
Here, due to the important role of the western unions and to employers' 
familiarity with the advantages of the "negotiated" model of competi-
tiveness, things look quite different. While in the new eastern German 
states labor is still less powerful and influential than in the western part 
of the country, its role is unmistakable and clearly embedded in the 
competitiveness of the eastern economy. Unions and works councils 
(often in collaboration with local and regional governments and busi-
nesses but also often quite on their own or in opposition) have devel-
oped strategies linking everything from job definitions and training 
mechanisms to local and regional economic development projects, 
retraining companies, and social and educational policies (see Wever 
1995; Turner 1995; and Knuth 1995). 
The contrast between eastern Germany and Poland is striking. Yet 
labors relative success in eastern Germany and its relative decline in 
Poland can hardly be attributed to differences in union power or strate-
gic aptitudes. While these variables are important, they do not appear to 
be determinant in regard to the dynamic of linkages. Rather, for these 
cases, contrasting institutional frameworks and union/employer deci-
sions appear decisive. 
Thirdly, labor is not necessarily involved at all as a unified actor at 
the intersection of employment relations and industrial growth and 
adjustment. It seems plausible, and certainly it would be nice if, over 
the long run, successful vertical and horizontal policy linkage required 
the incorporation of labors interests. Certainly no other institution can 
articulate workers' employment relations needs and interests as effec-
tively as good independent worker representation. In the short term, 
however, it is clear that economic growth and competitiveness are quite 
possible without such representation. 
The fact that linked policies supporting significant economic growth 
and development do not require any significant labor involvement is 
illustrated by the cases of Malaysia and the Philippines. In Malaysia 
political circumstances have made possible a shift to second-phase 
export-oriented growth. This, in turn, has necessitated increasing link-
ages across levels (e.g., to develop training programs that can provide 
the workforce necessary for competitive successes) and across political 
and economic domains (for instance, linking industrial policies with 
education policies). In the Philippine economy this transition has been 
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slower in coming, and there continues to be less linkage of both sorts, as 
well as a less competitive and more unevenly developed economy. The 
difference is most obvious in the area of training, which is considerably 
less developed than in Malaysia. 
But in both countries the repression of labor is striking, although in 
the Philippines it appears to be even greater by several measures than in 
Malaysia. The prevalence in Southeast Asia (as, indeed, elsewhere in the 
world) of management-dominated unions, the fragmented nature of the 
union movements, and the continued illegality of strikes in most core 
industries serve as reminders that powerful and independent worker 
representation does not inevitably accompany economic growth and 
competitiveness. 
It seems likely that we will see an eventual shift in policies to accom-
modate or at least quiet the large population of poor and un- or under-
employed who continue to be excluded from the benefits of growth. 
Those countries in Southeast Asia that have moved on to more advanced 
stages of development have all done so with some improvement in labor 
standards and loosening of restrictions on unions. But there is no reason 
to believe that a country could not go on for a long time—as the U.S. is 
apparently doing—faring quite well economically (albeit with pockets of 
extreme underdevelopment as well as widespread and growing income 
polarization) without a strong labor movement. 
Conclusion 
Worker representative organizations, institutions, and movements 
must find ways to insinuate themselves into the vertical and horizontal 
linkages between policies and negotiations—to perform linking func-
tions that make organized labor useful, if not necessary, to business and 
government decision makers interested primarily in economic growth. 
The shape of labors linking strategy in practice will vary significantly 
across settings. Politics and circumstances may require of labor only that 
it play a significant role in one of these linking functions in order to cre-
ate enough leverage to diffuse the benefits of growth and competitive-
ness. However, in some cases much more will be needed. 
Oddly enough, although the approach to comparative industrial rela-
tions implied by this analysis is new, these policy implications are not. 
The kinds of linking functions that labor has played in a variety of coun-
tries in the past illustrate the kinds of strategies called for today. For 
several postwar decades, the German works councils' value to manage-
ment had mostly (though not exclusively) to do with their taking over 
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and standardizing basic human resource management functions and 
quieting discontented workers. The German unions' contribution to the 
interests of German capital had a great deal to do with forcing employ-
ers to centralize collective bargaining, thus taking labor costs out of 
competition among employers, pushing companies to develop non-cost-
based competitive advantages in international markets (Streeck 1992). 
A central American union role in the New Deal system of industrial 
relations was to regulate the shopfloor, thus—in ways quite similar to 
the roles played by works councils in Germany—leaving management 
free to focus on other, more strategic and directly production-oriented 
matters (Katz 1985). Australian unions have maintained relevance and 
organizational integrity in a difficult period of industrial restructuring by 
actively promoting decentralized workplace flexibility from central 
union headquarters. 
The idea that organized labor needs to perform a useful socioeco-
nomic function—beyond the politically desirable function of represent-
ing the workplace interests of employees—is also old. What has been 
less apparent in the past is exactly where organized labor must seek its 
new roles. As noted above, the increasing diversity of local IR politics 
and outcomes means there can be no simple strategic formula equally 
applicable across the board. But the chapters in this volume lend 
enough further evidence to what we know about comparative industrial 
relations and political economy to narrow the locus of effective labor 
movement strategy to the points of linkage that are, first, most impor-
tant to the functioning of the political economy and, second, most acces-
sible to labor's influence. What labor needs is complementary and 
mutually reinforcing influence at national and local levels. 
What can be done in a given setting will be shaped by labor's organi-
zational and political power and influenced by institutional possibilities 
and constraints. But not to try to do something along these lines is to 
conspire in the continuing weakening of labor representation and work-
place democracy in supposedly democratic societies. 
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